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river only thirty-five miles in length. Mr. Justice Eager seemed to summarize
the view of the New York courts when he replied in an unreported decision
which denied a claimant's application that "It is true that the result is an
inequitable one, but the enforcement of a statute of limitations ofttimes results
in inequity.""' M. A. K.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN EXERCISED FOR THE TAKING OF NON-SLUM
LAND FOR PRVATE REDEVELOPMENT
One of the increasingly important problems facing our generation is that
of the physical deterioration of our cities and its expensive burden upon society.
Various measures and programs have been instituted at different levels of
government to alleviate this problem. One such attempt can be found in
section 1 of article XVIII of the Constitution of the State of New York,
wherein is provided legislative authority for slum clearance and the construction
of decent housing facilities for citizens of low income, and "for the clearance,
replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary
areas, or for both such purposes, and for recreational and other facilities inci-
dental or appurtenant thereto." For some time the frontal attack on urban
deterioration has proceeded along broad, general lines calling for the destruction
of slums and their replacement with new housing. Today, however, it is becom-
ing increasingly apparent that this is not enough; that there is need of a
complementary program of commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational,
and educational urban redevelopment, if existing patterns of deterioration
are to be checked and reversed. New York State embarked upon such a course
with the passage of a statute that gives cities the power of eminent domain for
reclaiming and redeveloping urban areas that are predominantly vacant and
economically dead, such that their continued existence impairs the sound
economic growth of the community, with the resultant development of slums
and blighted areas.
Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227
N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962), was an action instituted in the Supreme Court, Special
Term, Kings County, for a judgment declaring this statute, section 72-n of the
General Municipal Law,1 unconstitutional on its face. The action was brought
by sixty-eight home owners in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn whose land
is to be condemned and acquired by the city through a procedure authorized
by the statute. The homes of the plaintiffs are, for the most part, located in one
section of the total area to be condemned, but they were considered by the
New York City Board of Estimate and the City Planning Commission to be
17. Brief for Respondent, Schroeder v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 522, 180 N.E.2d
568, 225 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).
1. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law, § 72-n, Laws 1958, repealed and re-enacted in modified
form in Article 15.
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an integral part of a 95-acre parcel to be resold to private parties for the
development of an industrial park. It was determined by the Planning Com-
mission that this particular section of Brooklyn has become stagnant and
economically dead within the meaning of the statute, and that for purposes
of redevelopment, the wisest course of action would be the establishment of
industry in this area, which is at the present time seventy-five per cent vacant.
The decision of the Planning Commission was based upon an accumulation
of extensive data relating to sociological and historical findings bearing upon
the past, present, and future development of the city in general, and the borough
of Brooklyn in particular.
The plaintiffs asserted that the statute in question is unconstitutional on
its face in that it exceeds the concept of slum clearance as authorized by
article XVIII, section 1 of the Constitution, and that the taking of the land
in question cannot be for a public use because there is no "tangible physical
blight" in the area, i.e., it is non-slum, and because the land is to be resold
to private developers, although they will be guided by a municipal master-
plan. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint 2 and appeal was taken to the
Appellate Division, which affirmed.3
The majority of the Court of Appeals, concurring in the opinion of Chief
Judge Desmond, held that section 72-n was not unconstitutional on its face,
nor was its application in the instant case. The taking of non-slum land for
redevelopment by private corporations was held to be a species of public use,
where the area in question is seventy-five per cent vacant and has been sub-
divided in such a way as to prevent its effective economic development. It was
further held that such taking for redevelopment by needed industries was also
within the ambit of a public use. The decision is in no sense a departure from
previous rulings in similar situations. In Murray v. La Guardia,4 the plaintiff
resisted the condemnation of some eighteen city blocks, their clearance and
subsequent erection of thirty-five apartment buildings to house more than
24,000 people. Although the city of New York provided the masterplan for
development, the project was financed by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the plan and asserted the unconstitutionality of
the statute authorizing such action on the ground that it did not confine itself
to slum clearance and reconstruction for former slum dwellers. But the -Court
of Appeals held that article XVIII of the Constitution authorizes the legislature
to provide low cost housing for persons of low income,* or to reconstruct or
rehabilitate substandard and insanitary areas. It was not believed that the
mere fact that the project was to be carried out by a private corporation made
the taking and redevelopment of substandard land any less a species of public
use: "If upon completion of the project the public good is enhanced, it does
2. 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1960).
3. 14 A.D.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep't 1961).
4. 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943).
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not matter that private interests may be benefited."0, A like result was reached
by the Court of Appeals in Kaskel v. Impellitteri.0 Further support for this
view was found by the majority in an opinion by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Berman v. Parker wherein it was stated: "We cannot say that
public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of com-
munity redevelopment projects." 7
A lengthy minority opinion by Judge Van Voorhis founded its dissatisfaction
with the statute in question upon the assumption that land could be subject to
eminent domain even if it were not substandard or insanitary. It was felt that
in this particular case there had not been a finding "that any of this area is
substandard or insanitary, i.e., slum."8 The statute in question has clearly
confined itself to the taking of substandard and insanitary land for purposes of
redevelopment. And the findings of the City Planning Commission do in fact
designate this area to be "blighted," and in every sense of the word substandard
or insanitary. What must be remembered is that an area can be substandard, or
insanitary, or blighted without being a slum. If we are to follow the rule laid
down in Murray and Kaskel, it must inevitably follow that the taking of
substandard real estate by a municipality for redevelopment projects, even
where such redevelopment is to be in the hands of private capital, is a species
of public use; and this has been found to be within the ambit of constitutional
authority. There is no extension here and no departure from precedent as the
minority fears. A close reading of Murray and Kaskel reveals that an opposite
result from that achieved by the majority would mean a diluting of the full
import of these cases and a backward step for urban renewal progress.
There is further apprehension in the minority opinion that the power of
administrative bodies in determining what areas are to be condemned as sub-
standard, insanitary or blighted can be exercised in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. This is, of course, a possibility. The statutory machinery for slum
clearance and redevelopment necessitates the making of value judgments by
individuals who must decide what is substandard, insanitary, or blighted, and
what manner or mode of redevelopment will be in the public interest and for
a public use. This is one of the hazards of any democratic form of government
-that mistakes can be made; that unconstitutional statutes can be passed by
legislatures; that injustice can be perpetrated at the hands of administrative
officials. 1' But it is also one of the cornerstones of our system of government
5. Id. at 329, 52 N.E.2d at 888.
6. 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
7. 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).
8. 11 N.Y.2d 210, at 215, 182 N.E.2d 395, at 397, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, at 906.
9. Exhibit II, Record.
10. The language of the Court in Kaskel is especially pertinent with regard to this
apprehension of the minority: "It is not to be assumed that responsible public officers
will, in some future instance, label as 'substandard or insanitary' an area in which there
are no buildings at all, or fine, modern buildings only, or that they will attempt to con-
demn a number of such buildings by stretching the concept of 'area'. Such attempts can
be dealt with if and when they are made." Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 81, jig
N.E.2d 659, 663 (1953).
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that no citizen's grievance need go unheard where it is felt that his constitu-
tional rights have been negatived by a statute or its capricious administration
by government officials. This is why Cannata was brought-to seek a declar-
atory judgment pertaining to an administrative action thought to be based
upon an unconstitutional statute, capriciously applied by administrative officials.
That review having been granted, it was decided that the statute in question
is not unconstitutional on its face, nor is its proposed application to the facts
of the case. 1
The General Municipal Law, section 72-n is, in the last analysis, a
realistic approach to a problem that must be solved. By its application it will
eliminate not only existing slums, but potential slums as well and promote the
sound growth of the community. It recognizes that even before a slum exists
in a particular area the seeds of its birth may be present in such factors as the
subdivision of land into lots of such size and shape as to negative their develop-
ment into a healthy neighborhood; the existence of a poorly designed street
scheme; outmoded utilities and topographical conditions unsuited for effective
growth; buildings poorly designed and placed; old and dilapidated sanitary
facilities. It further recognizes that such areas are not only tomorrow's slums,
but today's tax delinquency and impediment to the providing of more vital
services for more citizens, and that one of the major urban needs is the reversal
of the industrial trend of abandoning the urban area because of a lack of
reasonably priced land for needed expansion.' 2 The inevitable result of elim-
inating such areas and reversing this trend is to provide more jobs for urban
workers, more income for their families, more tax revenue for the city govern-
ment-part of which will return to the task of urban redevelopment-and the
elimination of our slums before they begin. Thus the attack upon urban
deterioration advances from the stage of block-by-block destruction of slums
and the hasty reconstruction of neighborhoods, to that of a positive and
progressive program of slum prevention. And the desirability of the statute,
aside from its established constitutionality, is to be found in its recognition of
a carefully planned procedure by which substandard land is to be deemed
necessary for redevelopment and subject to condemnation and in its express
provision that any such area to be redeveloped must be "predominantly vacant."
It is submitted that the instant case represents an encouraging judicial affirma-
tion of a sound foundation for today's progress in urban redevelopment-the
cooperation of governmental authority and administration with the increasingly
important resources of the social and economic sciences.
1. P.M.
11. It has long been held that the question of whether or not a condemnation is
for public purpose is a judicial question. See Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y.
451, 99 N.E.2d 235 (1951).
12. Hoover and Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis 30 (1959). The authors point out
that New York City has lagged in the area of growing industries while merely holding
its own in the shrinking ones.
